Does Congress Abuse its Spending Clause Power by Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a State\u27s Compliance with Megan\u27s Law by Koenig, W. Paul
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 88
Issue 2 Winter Article 7
Winter 1998
Does Congress Abuse its Spending Clause Power
by Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of Federal
Law Enforcement Funds to a State's Compliance
with Megan's Law
W. Paul Koenig
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
W. Paul Koenig, Does Congress Abuse its Spending Clause Power by Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of Federal Law
Enforcement Funds to a State's Compliance with Megan's Law, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 721 (Winter 1998)
0091-4169/98/8802-0721
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL AW & CRIMINOLOGY VoL 88, No. 2
Copyright 0 1998 by Northwestcm University, School of Law Psihdn in USA.
COMMENT
DOES CONGRESS ABUSE ITS SPENDING
CLAUSE POWER BY ATTACHING
CONDITIONS ON THE RECEIPT
OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNDS




In July 1994, young Megan Kanka was violently raped and
murdered by her neighbor, thirty-two-year-old Jesse Timmende-
quas.1 Timmendequas lured seven-year-old Megan into his
home by offering to show her a puppy.2 He then tied a belt
around her neck and raped her as she was dying.3 Timmende-
quas dumped Megan's body next to a portable toilet in a
weeded area in a neighborhood park and then joined a search
party formed to look for the missing girl.4 Megan's body was
found days later in the same location where Timmendequas had
left it.5
' Sex Offender Charged in Girl's Strangulation: 7-Year-Old's Body Found After Massive
Search, THE RECORD (NORTHERN N.J.), Aug. 1, 1994, at A3. [hereinafter Sex Offender
Charged].
' Thousands Mourn Death, Rally for "Megan's Law," THE RECORD (NORTHMR N.J.),
Aug. 3, 1994, atA3 [hereinafter Thousands Mourn].
51d.
Matt Bai, A Report From the Front in the War on Predators, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1997,
at 67.
5 Sex Offender Charged, supra note 1, at A3.
W. PAUL KOF IG
Timmendequas had twice been convicted for committing
other child sex offenses. Yet it appears that no one in the
community knew about his past.7  Rather, the revelation of
Timmendequas's history of sex offenses stunned the neighbors,
including Megan's parents." On May 30, 1997, a NewJersey jury
found Timmendequas guilty of kidnapping, four counts of ag-
gravated sexual assault, and two counts of felony murder.9 On
June 20, 1997, he was sentenced to death.'0
No other crime evokes outrage in a community more than
sex crimes against children. The story of what happened to
Megan Kanka quickly gained national attention and resulted in
the recent passage of numerous state and federal laws targeting
the perpetrators of these acts. Part I of this Comment will first
explore the crimes that led to this national explosion of legisla-
tion. This section will then look at some of the state laws and
the amended federal version of Megan's Law. Part II looks at
the constitutional challenges to state versions of Megan's Law.
Part III examines in greater detail a potential Spending Clause
challenge to Megan's Law. This Comment questions whether
the amended federal statute violates Congress's limited power
under the Spending Clause to attach conditions to a grant of
federal funds to the states. If the relationship between the con-
dition set upon the receipt of federal funds and the purpose for
the federal expenditure is tenuous, the Court should find the
condition to be an unconstitutional attempt at federal regula-
tion. Because the relationship is not tenuous, Congress has not
violated its powers under the Spending Clause in attaching a
6Id.
7 Id. In addition, both of Timmendequas's roommates were convicted sex offend-
ers. The three men met at a correctional facility for the treatment of compulsive sex
offenders. Thousands Mourn, supra note 2, at A3.
8 Sex Offender Charged supra note 1, at A3. However, many of the neighbors did
know that Timmendequas's roommate, Joseph Cifelli, had spent time in a prison for
sex offenders, and that Cifelli had met his roommates in prison. Megan' Laws: More
Menace Than Help ?, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 27, 1997, at 9A.
9 Child-sex Offender Guilty of Murder, "Megans ;Law"Figure May Face Death, CI-. TRIB.,
May 31, 1997, at 3.
" Ralph Siegel, Megan's Law Upheld; Next Step is Sex-Offender Notification, SEATLE
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at A4.
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condition of state compliance with the amended Megan's Law
statute on the state's receipt of federal law enforcement funds.
Part III also addresses whether Congress should involve it-
self in the regulation of sex offenders. Congress should not al-
ways legislate simply because it has the power to do so. This
Comment argues that while the problem of how to control
crimes against children is an issue of national concern, resolu-
tion of this problem is best left to the states. States should be al-
lowed to form their own decisions without risking the loss of
their share of federal crime fighting funds.
A. BACKGROUND
Unfortunately, Megan is just one of many children who be-
came the victim of a child predator. For example, in 1990, a
seven-year-old boy was lured into the woods of Washington, ab-
ducted, raped, stabbed, and mutilated.11 The perpetrator, Earl
Shriner, cut off the boy's penis and left him to die. The boy
was found cowering the woods, naked, and in a state of shock.
3
He survived and identified Shriner as his attacker. 4 At the time,
Shriner was out on bail pending a rape charge, and had multi-
ple previous convictions for sexual offenses involving children.5
Similarly, on September 4, 1989, Westley Dodd abducted
and killed two young brothers, Cole and William Neer, in a park
in Vancouver, Washington. 6 Dodd had packed a lunch that day
so that he could stalk children without interruption. After
hours of waiting for a suitable target, Dodd spotted the Neer
boys riding their bikes.'8 Dodd tied the boys' hands and pro-
"John Leo, What Should Society Do With Sexual Predators?, SEArL TIMns, Dec. 17,
1996, at B5.
12 id.
" SeeAnnJapenga, Solace With Strings: Sympathy for a Molested Boy Turns to Resentment
of His Mothers Use of a Trust Fund, LA. TIMES,Jan. 7, 1990, at El.
" James Popkins et al., Natural Born Predators: Frightened Communities are Rising up
Against Sex Offenders, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 73.
15 Id.
"James Wallace, Dodd: Two People, One a "Monster," SEATrE POST-INTELIGENCER,





ceeded to sodomize Cole.' 9 Dodd then stabbed both boys with a
fish fillet knife and left them dead in the park.20
A month later, Dodd preyed again, this time on a four-year-
old boy named Lee Joseph Iseli.2' Dodd sexually abused the boy
for hours and then strangled him.2 The next day when he re-
turned from work, Dodd sexually abused the corpse.23 Dodd
later estimated that he had previously molested around thirty
children. 24 In a brief to the court, Dodd stated, "[i]f I do es-
cape, I promise you I will kill again and rape again, and I will
enjoy every minute of it."2 The State of Washington executed
Dodd on January 5, 1993 in the first legal hanging in the United
States since 1965.6 Similar tragic stories abound.2
B. THE STATE LAWS
These crimes against children sparked local movements, of-
ten led by the parents of the victims, for legislative reform.28
The parents and communities cried out that if they had known
the danger posed by their previously convicted neighbors, they
may have been able to protect their children.2 The politicians
responded.- ° Starting in Washington, the site of the seven-year-
old boy's kidnapping and mutilation, and continuing in New
Jersey, where Megan Kanka was abducted, state after state
passed statutes designed to protect their children from sexually







Leo, supra note 11, at B5.
26 See Today inHistoy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 5, 1998, at Al2.
" See, e.g., Ernie Allen, Missing Children: A Fearfid Epidemic, USA TODAY, July 1, 1994
(Magazine), at 46.
"See, e.g., Ivette Mendez, "Megans Laws" Youngsters Murder Prompts Flur of Sex
Crime Legislation, THE STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 4, 1994, available in 1994 WL 7866200.
2Id.
soId.
" In NewJersey, the legislators rushed the provision, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c:7-1 to :7-
11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997), to the floor as an emergency measure due to the public
outcry over the loss of Megan Kanka. With minimal debate, the legislation was passed
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released sex-offenders to register with local law enforcement
agencies. 2 These statutes differ in the scope of persons who fall
within the purview of the registration requirements.3 The state
laws also differ in the information a registrant must give when
registering.3 Two states do not apply their law retroactively.3
with no member voting against it. See Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3d
Cir. 1996).
532 SeeALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200 to -203 (1994); AiASA STAT. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (Mi-
chie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3825 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 291 (West
1989 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-102r to -102s (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4120 (1995 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21, 944.606 (West Supp. 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (Harrison 1994); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 707-743 (Supp. 1995);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COm. STAT. ANN. 150/1 to /10.9
(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -12-13 (West Supp. 1996);
IOWA CODE § 692A.1-.15 (Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 224901 to -4910 (1995 &
Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500-.540 (Michie 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:540-:549 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34A, §§ 11101-11105,
11125, 11141-11144 (West Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §792 (1996); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 6 §§ 178C-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
28.721-.732 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West Supp. 1997); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.600-.625 (West
Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -508 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-
4001 to -4013 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.151-.157 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 651-B:1 to -B:9 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 &
Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 to -8 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1996); N.Y.
CORREcr. LAW §§ 168-a to -v (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5-.13
(Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2950.01-.99 (Banks Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1997 ); ORLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587
(West 1991 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.585-.602 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9791-9799.6 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to -19 (Supp.
1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 22-22-30 to 41 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108
(Supp. 1996); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413
(Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130-.140 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to -10
(Supp. 1997); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (West Supp. 1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-
301 to -306 (Michie 1997).
-" Compare ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200, 13A-12-131 (1994) (display of an obscene
bumper sticker will trigger the registration requirements), with CAL. PENAL CODE §§
290, 647(d) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (conviction of loitering outside a public
restroom for a lewd or lascivious purpose will trigger the registration requirements).
Compare IA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.542(B) (West Supp. 1997), and N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 29-11A4 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1996) (requiring the offender to provide the
government agency with his place of employment), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17.500(3) (Michie 1996) (requiring the offender to give vehicle registration data).
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Most importantly, significant variation exists in the extent to
which this information will be made available to the public.ss
Only seven states do not allow for public notification.3 7
The rationales behind these laws are compelling. Because
of the appalling nature of child sex crimes, legislative debate of-
ten focuses on their horrors. Legislators also have noted that
the Government has a duty to protect its citizens, especially the
young, who are the least able to protect themselves.8 Further-
more, the problem is widespread. Estimates are that one of
every three girls and one of every seven boys will be the victim of
sexual abuse before the child reaches the age of eighteen.s9
Also, the rate of recidivism for sexual offenders is higher
than that for other crimes. 40 The perpetrators often seem un-
able to prevent themselves from repeatedly engaging in sexually
violent behavior. Congressman Charles Schumer of New York
addressed this issue in the congressional debate over Megan's
Law, stating that "sexual offenders are different."41 Congress-
man Schumer noted that long prison terms often do not deter
these men from committing future acts of violence. 42 Addition-
ally, attempts at rehabilitation frequently fail.43 In the words of
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West Supp. 1997); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9793 (West Supp. 1997).
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4(a) (allowing members of the public to find out
whether a person is registered as offender if they can give law enforcement agency
identifying information about person in question), with TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-13c.1 (permitting local newspapers in Texas to publish identification of any sex
offender who moves into the neighborhood).
" See Bai, supra note 4, at 67 (listing Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, and Wyoming as lacking a statutory notification provision).
3See, e.g., 142 CONG. REG. H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
"9 See Michele L Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws:
The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlt Letter
Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L REv. 788, 789 (1996).
40 See Daniel L. Feldman, The Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s: A Response to Citics, 60
ALB. L Ray. 1081, 1125 n.131 (1997).
"142 CONG. Rc. H4453 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement ofRep. Schumer).
42 Id.
" Id. But cf. RobertJ. McGrath, Sex-Offender Risk Assessment and Disposition Planning.
A Review of Empirical and Clinical Findings, 35 INT'LJ. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRMI~nOLOGY 328, 331 (1995) (arguing that predicting the risk that any individual sex
offender will strike again is difficult to determine with any accuracy).
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Congressman Schumer, "[nio matter what we do, the minute
they get back on the street, many of them resume their hunt for
victims, beginning a restless and unrelenting prowl for children
... to molest, abuse, and in the worst cases, to kill.""
Because of the disturbing nature of these crimes and an
understandable lack of sympathy for the perpetrators, lawmak-'
ers have overwhelmingly supported community notification
laws. The laws often pass with little debate and strong bipartisan
support.4 It appears that no politician wants to vote against
such a bill and be left with the unenviable task of explaining to
her constituency that she voted for the rapists over the children
because she had constitutional concerns.
However, this has not prevented legal commentators, who
are immune from the pressures of the popular vote, from rais-
ing their own doubts as to the constitutionality of Megan's Law.
Additionally, released offenders who were required to register
with local law enforcement agencies under the act have also
brought constitutional challenges.46 Part II will examine the
substance of these challenges to the state laws and the treatment
the challenges have received in court.
C. THE FEDERALIZATION OF MEGAN'S LAW
In 1989, Jacob Wetterling was abducted near his home in
Minnesota. 47 Jacob has not been found to date, and law en-
forcement officers have not apprehended the perpetrator.48 Ja-
cob's abduction occurred prior to the passage of a Minnesota
" 142 CONG. REC. H4453 (daily ed. May 7, 1996). Fearing that sex offenders will
continue to molest children after being released from prison, Texas, Montana, and
California have passed laws which allow for the voluntary surgical castration of repeat
sex-offenders while they are in prison. Michael T. McSpadden, Time For Public Debate
on Castrating Sex Offenders, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 16, 1997, at 21. California is
the only state to require recidivist sex offenders released on parole to receive chemical
injections that suppress sex drive (but only if the victim is less than 13-years-old).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1997).
" See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S4921 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dole
noting the unanimous passage of Megan's Law in the House of Representatives).
"See, e.g., Artway v. NewJersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).47 Dan Oberdorfer, Wetterling Friends Show Their Support-$100,00 Reward Yields No
Clues, STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 30, 1989, at lB.
"Richard Meryhew, Missing Girl Haunts Those Looking for Her, STAR-TRmuNE, June
27, 1996, at lB.
1998]
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State law requiring sex offenders to register,49 and spurred
communities nationwide to press for change.50  Furthermore,
the disappearance of Jacob was the first of these crimes to have
an impact at the federal level, leading Minnesota Congressman
Jim Ramstad's work on what would eventually become the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Of-
fender Registration Program (Wetterling Act).51
1. The Origins of the Federal Law
Congress passed the Wetterling Act as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.52 The bill
gave the States an incentive to "implement a system where all
persons who commit sexual or kidnapping crimes against chil-
dren or who commit sexually violent crimes against any person
(whether adult or child) are required to register their address
with the state upon their release from prison."3 The law also al-
lowed state law enforcement agencies to release "relevant in-
formation" about the convict that the agencies believed the
public should know for protection.54
The 1994 Act did not require the states to comply with its
mandates. However, it did provide that "a State's failure to im-
plement such a system by September 1997 will result in that
State losing a part of its annual federal crime-fighting fund-
ing."55 If a state failed to comply, it would lose 10% of its allot-
ted share of federal crime fighting funds. 6 Thus, a state which
elects not to comply with the federal requirements will currently
" See Steve Berg, Jacob's Mom Backs Proposal in Congress, STAR-TRIBUNE, Aug. 1, 1991,
at 3B.
' Jill Hodges, New Wetterling Campaign Puts National TV Spotlight on Kid-Safe and
Missing, STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept. 23, 1991, at 1B; Neal Gendler, Veterans Walk to Raise
Money, Concern for Wetterling, STAR-TRIBuNE, Dec. 26, 1989, at 2B.
, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1997).
52 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
5 I1d.
5' 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1995).
H.R. REP. No. 104-555, at 2 (1996).
42 U.S.C. § 14071(f) (1997).
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lose a part of its portion of over $100 million in federal funds.5 7
As a result, Congress reserved the ability to exert further pres-
sure on the states to notify the public when sex offenders are re-
leased into their communities.
2. Amendment to the 1994Act
The efficacy of the Wetterling Act proved unsatisfactory to
its drafters because some states were apparently reluctant to re-
lease the registrant's information to the community 8 Thus, in
1996, Congress passed an amendment to the 1994 Act, spon-
sored by Senator Dick Zimmer of New Jersey, which greatly
strengthened its language.5 9 The amendment changed the lan-
guage of the statute from local law enforcement agencies "may'
disclose relevant information as needed to protect the public, to
local law enforcement agencies "shall release relevant informa-
tion that is necessary to protect the public." 60 The amendment
also formally renamed the 1994 Act "Megan's Law."61  Thus,
states now have an affirmative obligation to comply with Me-
gan's Law and release information about convicted sex offend-
ers "sufficient to protect the public" if they wish to continue to
receive their full share of federal law enforcement funds. 2 Fail-
ure to meet this obligation will result in a loss of 10% of the
17 Earl-Hubbard, supra note 39, at 796. Additionally, the Act allows Congress to in-
crease this $100 million in funding with each subsequent annual budget. See id. at
862 n.43.
142 CONG. REc H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
"H.R. 2137, 104th Cong. (1996), reprinted in 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
142 CONG. RIc. H4451 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (emphasis added).
6 H.R. 2137, 104th Cong. (1996), reprinted in 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). Unless other-
wise stated, any references to "Megan's Law" in the remainder of this Comment will
refer to the amended federal statute.
The amended section of the statute now reads:
(d) Release of information
(1) The information collected under a State registration program may be
disclosed for any purpose permitted under the laws of the State.
(2) The designated State law enforcement agency and any local law en-
forcement agency authorized by the State agency shall release relevant in-
formation that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific
person required to register under this section, except that the identity of a
victim of an offense that requires registration under this section shall not be
released.
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1997).
19981
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federal law enforcement funds allotted by the federal govern-
ment to that state.6e The constitutionality of this amendment is
the focus of this Comment.
On May 7, 1996, the House of Representatives passed the
amendment by a unanimous vote of 418 to 0.' Two days later,
the amendment passed in the Senate by a voice vote.6 Presi-
dent Clinton signed the amendment into law on May 17, 1996.r
The congressional debates (or, more appropriately, conver-
sations) were as one-sided as the votes. 67 Numerous members of
Congress rose to praise and support the bill and its drafters.6
Only two Congressmen questioned the bill's legality. Con-
gressman John Conyers (D-Mich.) raised the issue of whether
the registration requirement imposes an unconstitutional Ex
Post Facto punishment.0 Mr. Conyers warned that "this [bill]
may be good from this point on, but.., it could present a prob-
lem in the courts in the- future."70 Congressman Conyers also
noted that while the bill is not an unfunded mandate, it does
impose a penalty on the states for non-compliance.71 Despite his
doubts about the constitutionality of the bill, Mr. Conyers
joined in support of the measure.
Congressman Mel Watt (D-N.C.) raised the same legal issues
with greater vigor. Mr. Watt questioned the prudence of not al-
lowing "States to make their own decisions about whether they
want a Megan's law or do not want a Megan's law."7 Watt criti-
cized what he called "Big Brother Government" for trying to
force state compliance with something that is not necessarily a
6Id.
142 CONG. REc. S4921 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Senator Dole).
6Id.
66 142 CONG. Rmc. D495 (daily ed. May 17, 1996).
67 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H4451-H4457 (daily ed. May 7, 1996).
"See, e.g., id. (statements of Reps. McCollum, Conyers, Zimmer, Schumer, Smith,
Schroeder, Gunningham, Jackson-Lee, and Lofgren) (all rising in strong support of
the amendment).
69 Id at H4452 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
70 Id. For a discussion of the potential Ex Post Facto problem, see infra notes 76-
104 and accompanying text.
" 142 CONG. REc. H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
7Id. at H4456 (statement of Rep. Watt).
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federal issue.73 Despite his concerns, Congressman Watt ulti-
mately joined his colleagues, and the bill passed unanimously.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO MEGAN'S LAW
Before beginning an analysis of the constitutionality of
"Megan's Law," this Comment will look at some of the other
grounds on which the state statutes have been challenged.
These constitutional challenges are not the Comment's focus.
Nonetheless, it is important to look at the substance of the
claims being made, for if the release of information under Me-
gan's Law is found to be unconstitutional, the 1996 Amendment
will also be invalid. Congress cannot condition the receipt of
federal funds on a state's performance of an unconstitutional
act.74
A. REGISTRANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Since the inception of the state sex offender notification
and registration laws in New Jersey, released offenders have ar-
gued that the laws violate their constitutional -rights.75 This sec-
tion will consider three of the challenges: (1) that the state laws
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) that the laws violate the
Eighth Amendment; and (3) that the laws are unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Challenges
The challenge that has enjoyed the greatest success in court
is the claim that the state statutes violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution. 76 This Clause has been interpreted
to mean that "the government may not apply a law retroactively
that 'inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
73 id.
71 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
75 Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Vio-
lent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 89,91 n.18 (1996).
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("[nlo State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, Ex Post




crime, when committed.'"" Thus, for instance, if, at the time a
crime is committed, the designated punishment for commission
of that crime is one year imprisonment, the government cannot
decide after the offender has perpetrated the act that the
proper sentence for that person's act should be five years.
Released offenders who have been required to register with
law enforcement agencies after being paroled have argued that
the dispersal of this information to their community imposes a
punishment not allowed for at the time their crime was commit-
ted. They therefore claim that the registration and notification
requirements are in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.78
These petitioners argue that the release of their personal in-
formation inflicts a retroactive punishment upon them that was
not annexed at the time of their sentence.
The New Jersey Supreme Court was not persuaded by this ar-
gument and upheld the constitutionality of the New Jersey state
"Megan's Law."79 However, in Artway v. New Jersey, the District
Court of New Jersey concluded that the public notification re-
quirement of Megan's Law was an unconstitutional violation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause.80 Artway, a released sex offender, was
required to register with state law enforcement agencies upon
his release from prison.8' Furthermore, depending on the re-
sults of a state assessment of Artway's risk of recidivism (which
had not been conducted at the time of trial), New Jersey would
also potentially release his registration information to the com-
munity.
8 2
On appeal, the Third Circuit distinguished registration with
law enforcement agencies from community notification.3 The
Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1253 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d
Cir. 1996) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
78 See id. at 1242; Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rowe v. Bur-
ton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Alaska 1994), appeal dismissed, Doe I v. Burton, 85
F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (D.N.J. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (NJ. 1995).
Artway v. NewJersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 669 (D.NJ. 1995), aff'd in part and vacated
in par 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.), rehg kdenied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996).
"Id.
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242.
Id. at 1265.
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court upheld the requirement that released sex offenders regis-
ter with local law enforcement agencies." The court concluded
that required registration with local law enforcement agencies
had a legitimate regulatory purpose and should not be catego-
rized as punitive.5 Because the registration requirement alone
does not constitute punishment, the court said that it cannot
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."
In contrast, the court found persuasive Artway's argument
that the release of this information to the community was an
additional punishment.87 However, while the court found Art-
way's argument convincing, it vacated the district court's hold-
ing because Artway's challenge to the notification requirements
was not ripe for adjudication.88 Because the results of the risk
assessment were not known at the time of the trial, it was not
clear whether his personal registration information would ever
be disseminated to the public.8 However, dicta strongly implied
that once a ripe challenge was brought, the court would hold
that the notification provision did indeed violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.9
Other federal courts have also concluded that the release of
information to the public can be a punitive act.9' For instance,
in Doe v. Pataki, the Southern District of New York held that the
"public notification provisions of the Act are punitive," and
therefore violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.92 In finding the Act
Id. at 1265-67.
"Id.
Id. at 1267. The court also found that since the registration requirement does
not constitute punishment, it does not violate either the Double Jeopardy or Bill of
Attainder Clauses.
" Id. at 1242 ("Artway's contention that notification constitutes punishment is
primafacie quite persuasive ...").
"Id. at 1242, 1246-51 ("Article II, as part of its 'case or controversy' mandate, re-
quires parties to suffer injury or come into immediate danger of suffering an injury
before challenging a statute"). See also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49
(1967).
89 Artway, 81 F.3d at 1248, 1252. The court also vacated the lower court's issuance
of a temporary injunction on the notification provision. Id. at 1271.
gId. at 1252.
" See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F.
Supp. 691,700-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
"Patak, 919 F. Supp. at 700-01.
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punitive, the court noted that regardless of the legislature's
regulatory intent, the release of information has repeatedly re-
sulted in the released offender being ostracized, harassed,
threatened, or fired from his job.3
Therefore, before last summer, it was not clear whether the
notification provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when
applied to individuals who were convicted prior to the passage
of the state statutes. However, two recent cases dramatically
turn the tide in favor of upholding the statutes against Ex Post
Facto challenges.
First, on June 23, 1997, the Supreme Court delivered an
opinion that dramatically strengthened the validity of Megan's
Law, Kansas v. Hendricks.9 In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court ruled
that a Kansas law requiring the civil confinement of some sexual
offenders who had completed their prison sentence did not vio-
late the Ex Post Facto Clause.95 The Kansas law at issue estab-
lished a procedure for the involuntary civil commitment of
violent sex offenders found to have a "mental abnormality" or a
"personality disorder" at the time of their release from prison
that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence.96 The Court found the statute constitutional, stating, "[i] t
* . .cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a
limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our under-
standing of ordered liberty."9 7 The Court ruled that the civil
confinement did not violate either the Double Jeopardy prohi-
bition or the Ex Post Facto Clause because the law did not sub-
ject the affected individuals to further punishment." Writing
for the majority, Justice Thomas stated that the additional con-
finement was not punitive because institutionalized mentally-ill
persons are confined for civil purposes rather than punishment
and are not subject to "punitive conditions."9
"Id. at 701.
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
"Id. at 2076-77.
'KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 to a17 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
' Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979)).
"Id. at 2081, 2086.
9Id. at 2085-86.
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Since the Court's decision in Hendricks, the Third Circuit
has revisited the constitutionality of the notification provision in
state sex offender statutes. In stark contrast to its apparent posi-
tion in Artway v. New Jersey,1' ° the Third Circuit reversed course
in E.B. v. Verniero, where it held that the notification provisions
in Megan's Law are not punitive.'0 ' The effect of the Hendricks
decision on the Third Circuit's apparent change in position is
clear. The court stated:
We believe the state's interest in protecting the public here is similar to,
and as compelling as, the state interest served by the civil commitment
statute in Hendricks. Accordingly, based on Hendricks, we believe that the
state's interest here would suffice to justify the deprivation even if a fun-
damental right of the registrant's were implicated. Given that something
less than a fundamental interest is implicated, the impact of Megan's
Law on the registrants' repuiational interests is necessarily insufficient
alone to constitute "punishment.!
Thus, the court ruled that the state law reasonably carries out
the legislature's remedial purpose without imposing punitive
hardships.'03 Because the Third Circuit found that notification
is not punishment, it held that the state version of Megan's Law
does not violate either the Ex Post Facto or the Double Jeopardy
prohibition.' 4 Based on the Third Circuit's radical change in
posture, it appears likely that other federal courts will likewise
hold that reasonable limitations of sex offender's liberty inter-
ests do not violate their rights under either the Ex Post Facto or
Double Jeopardy Clauses.
2. Eighth Amendment Challenges
Registrants could also attack Megan's Law on the grounds
that the release of information to the community constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment.
0 5
'0 The Third Circuit first addressed the issue in Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235
(3d Cir.), reh kdenied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996), and found the issue not ripe for re-
view. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
"0" E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d Cir. 1997).
'2 Id. at 1104.
,13 Id. at 1096.
'"Id. at 1105.
'05 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
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To determine whether the release of information regarding sex
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment, a court must first as-
sess whether the release of this information constitutes punish-
ment,' 6 If the release of information is considered punitive, the
court must then determine whether the punishment is cruel
and unusual.0 7
Whether the release of information is punitive is addressed
above in the discussion of the Ex Post Facto inquiry.10 8 If the act
is punitive, the court must then consider whether the punish-
ment is cruel and unusual. Whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual is determined by "'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,' and so [it] admits
of few absolute limitations."1' 9 Even if a sentence is not itself
considered cruel and unusual by these evolving standards, it can
rise to the level of cruel and unusual if the punishment causes
third parties to behave in a manner that imposes cruel and un-
usual conditions on the convicted individual."0 However, this
can only occur if the government was aware of the danger of
vigilante violence and did not take remedial measures to pre-
vent it."'
Critics have asserted that state versions of Megan's Law can
be considered cruel and unusual because of vigilante attacks vis-
ited on sex offenders following the release of information about
them to the community." 2 Indeed, the threat of vigilante vio-
lence against offenders required to register is real. On numer-
ous occasions, released offenders have been attacked or driven
away.'' The Eighth Amendment challenge to notification laws
" For a detailed discussion as to whether this release of information is punitive or
regulatory, see Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-64 (3d Cir.), rehk denied, 83
F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996).
107 See id.
'08 See supra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
,,0 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 848 (1994).
'"Id.
" See, e.g., Earl-Hubbard, supra note 39, at 823-25.
13 For example, in Texas, a released offender could not begin counseling because
vigilante activity forced him to move repeatedly. Christy Hoppe & Diane Jennings,
Ex-inmates Pose Quanday for Many States; Convicts Seen as Threat Even After Their Release,
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contends that, when releasing information to the public about
convicted sex offenders, the government is aware of the threat
vigilante neighbors present to the convicted sex offender and
has nevertheless failed to take measures to protect the registrant
from the inherent physical and psychological harm.11 4 Further-
more, this argument asserts that allowing (and perhaps encour-
aging) this neighborhood vigilantism is cruel and unusual."5
This theory has not been ruled upon in any of the cases that
have challenged Megan's Law because the courts that have the
release of information to be punitive have not gone on to con-
sider whether the punishment is cruel and unusual. Thus, it is
also not clear whether the amended version of the federal Me-
gan's Law statute is an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, based on the recent decisions in Hen-
dricks"5 and Verniero,117 it is unlikely that the Court will find
community notification punitive. Therefore, the odds of the
Court even reaching the second prong of the inquiry in future
cases are slim.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Finally, the courts and legal critics have considered whether
state registration and notification statutes violate any of the sub-
stantive due process rights protected by the Fourteenth
DALLAS MoRNiNG NEws, Aug. 29, 1993, at Al. In Washington, vigilantes burned down
a child sex-offender's house shortly before his sentence was to end. Rick Hampson,
Mhat's Gone Wrong with Megan's Law?; Notfication: Reason for Law is its Biggest Problem,
USA TODAY, May, 14, 1997, at Al.
Attacks have not been limited to sex-offenders. On more than one occasion, vigi-
lantes harassed or beat an innocent person whom they mistakenly believed to be the
released offender. For instance, in Phillipsburg, New Jersey, a man broke into the
house that the police reported as being the residence of a sex offender and beat up
the person he found sleeping on the sofa. The person on the sofa was not the sex-
offender. Id. Likewise, in Manhattan, Kansas, state officials mistakenly identified a
trailer inhabited by a family with two daughters as the residence of a sex offender.
The children were harassed and rocks were thrown at the trailer until the mistake was
corrected. Man Mistakenly Branded as Sex Offender by Offidals, DES MOnES REGISER,
May 4, 1997, at A4.
' Earl-Hubbard, supra note 39, at 823-25.
115 Id.
116 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,(1997).
,
7 E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Amendment."" The requirement of substantive due process
prohibits a state from arbitrarily depriving an individual of a
due process right.119 Professor Lewis argues that the registration
and notification requirements effectively brand a person who
has paid his debt to society with a scarlet letter.'2 She asserts
that this state-imposed scarlet letter arbitrarily deprives the per-
son of the right to privacy, personal safety, employment, and
travel-all of which should be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 Additionally, Professor Lewis argues that the re-
leased offenders are deprived of these rights without due proc-
ess because the registration statutes impose additional
punishment on released sex offenders as a group rather than
adjudicating each case individually.1 22
In addressing a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the
Third Circuit said that requiring the released offender to regis-
ter with a state agency does not violate any due process rights."
However, the court did not express an opinion as to whether a
registrant could successfully challenge the release of this infor-
mation to the community under the Fourteenth Amendment.1
24
The Doe v. Pataki court did not reach the Fourteenth
Amendment question.Iss The court decided that the release of
information under Megan's Law was an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and therefore found it unnec-
essary to rule on whether the statute was also violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 26  Thus, there is not yet dispositive
authority regarding whether the release of information violates
an individual's substantive due process rights.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
"' SeeYoungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982).12
' Lewis, supra note 75, at 102-03.
121 Id. at 102-15.
2 Id. at 103.
"2 Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.), reh' denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir.
1996).
124 Id. at 1251-52.
2' Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,702 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
126 id.
738 [Vol. 88
FEDERALISM & MEGAN'S LAW
These and other constitutional challenges'2 are not the fo-
cus of this Comment. However, if the release of information
under Megan's Law is found to be unconstitutional, the 1996
Amendment will also be invalid because Congress cannot condi-
tion the receipt of federal funds on the states agreeing to per-
form an illegal act. 28 For the purpose of investigating whether
the conditions which the 1996 Amendment adds to Megan's
Law are a legitimate exercise of the federal government's spend-
ing power, it will be assumed in this Comment that the underly-
ing law is constitutional.
B. FEDERALISM CONCERNS REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE 1996 AMENDMENT
The amended version of Megan's Law faces a new potential
adversary-the states themselves. The 1996 Amendment to the
Jacob Wetterling Act conditions state receipt of certain federal
law enforcement funds on the state agreeing to implement a
specified regulatory scheme.'2 This provision potentially vio-
lates the limits on federal power enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. To determine the constitutionality of the amendment, this
Comment will first ascertain whether it is within Congress's
enumerated powers to compel the states to enact and enforce a
program designed to regulate convicted sex offenders. Second,
assuming Congress cannot require the states to implement a
regulatory plan, this Comment will consider whether the con-
gressional use of monetary incentives to encourage the states to
enact laws regulating released offenders is a legitimate exercise
of the federal Spending Clause power.130
'2 For instance, Megan's Law has also been challenged on the grounds that it vio-
lates the bill of attainder and double jeopardy clauses. SeeArtway, 81 F.3d at 1242.
'28 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
'2 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f) (2) (1996). See supra text accompanying notes 58-73.
'" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for common De-
fence and general welfare of the United States... .").
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1. The Federal Government's Enumerated Limitations
Congress's powers are limited to those enumerated in the
Constitution.13 ' Those powers that are not given to the federal
government are reserved to the states by the Tenth Amend-
ment.13 2  The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the
Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered."13  Thus, "[t]he States unquestiona-
bly do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority...
to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of
their original powers and transferred those powers to the Fed-
eral Government."134
In determining whether a federal regulation is a legitimate
exercise of congressional power, one of the factors on which the
Court focuses is whether the questioned statute governs private
individuals or the states themselves.'5 As the Court stated in
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, when Con-
gress attempts to regulate the states qua states,
the Tenth Amendment requires recognition that "there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that man-
.136
ner.
Law enforcement historically has been considered one of
these attributes of state sovereignty upon which the federal gov-
"' Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
13 U.S. CoNST. amend. X ("l[t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people").
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985) (internal
quotation omitted). For a thorough analysis of Tenth Amendment case law history,.
see John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology, or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment Since
United States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L REv. 445 (1996-97).
"' National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) (holding federal
extension of minimum wage and maximum hour laws to state employees constitu-
tional under Commerce Clause).
" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286-87
(1981) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
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ernment cannot easily infringe.3 7 Thus, Congress is greatly re-
stricted in the degree to which it can regulate a state's admini-
stration of its local law enforcement agencies."'
Because of this limited power over the states, particularly in
areas such as law enforcement, Congress cannot "comman-
dee [r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compel-
ling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." 9
Furthermore, even if Congress has the authority to regulate or
prohibit certain acts if it chooses to do so, it cannot force the
states "to require or prohibit those acts."
This was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Printz
v. United States.'4' In Printz, the Court held that sections of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922, which
compelled state agents to temporarily administer a federal regu-
latory program were unconstitutional.42 The provisions in ques-
tion required state law enforcement officials to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The
Petitioners, law enforcement officers from Montana and Ari-
zona, argued that the Brady Act forced them into federal service
by requiring them to perform the background checks and re-
lated functions necessary to implement the federal program.
14 4
Petitioners claimed that this federal coercion of state officials
was unconstitutional.1 4 The Court agreed, saying that the fed-
eral government cannot compel states to administer a federal
program.4  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, "[i] t is
'37 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (stating that law enforcement is
an area where states historically are sovereign).
13 Id.
Hode4 452 U.S. at 288.
"0 NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). For a criticism of New York,
see Martin H. Redish, Doing It With Mim: New York v. United States and Constitu-
tional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
593 (1994) (arguing that the "Court imposed constitutional limits on congressional
power that derive from nowhere in the text of the Constitution").
.. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
' Id. at 2368.
14 Id.
'4 Id. at 2369.
1 Id.
" Id. at 2383.
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the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests
can overcome that fundamental defect.
" 147
To find otherwise would violate the doctrine of accountabil-
ity.1 This doctrine states that the government official who
elects to enact a certain statute should be held accountable to
the public for that decision. Only then can the constituency
elect the candidate who enacts legislation which comports with
the majority's interest."5 In contrast, "where the Federal Gov-
ernment directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insu-
lated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."'5'
This limited power over the states applies equally to the
federal Megan's Law statute. As repugnant as child sex crimes
are, Congress is still without the power to force state legislatures
against their will to pass laws regulating the crime. 2 However,
Printz is not directly controlling to the question raised by this
Comment because with Megan's Law, the federal government is
not compelling states to release sex offender information. At
least in theory, states can choose to refuse to release this infor-
mation and forego the federal funds. Thus, Megan's Law is un-
like the provisions of the Brady Act struck down in Printz
because it does not compel the states to do anything.
However, this distinction becomes less clear if the entice-
ment of federal funds becomes so strong that it presents the
states with no realistic choice. If the states are sufficiently de-
pendant on the federal funds, it may not matter that they have
147 Id.
'
4 8New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
Id. at 168-69; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining
the Problem of Federal Spending, 4 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 482 (1995).
0 New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
I' d. at 169; see also Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382:
By forcing state governments to absorb the fi'nancial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving"
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the
costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of tak-
ing the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.
52 See, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365.
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choice in theory. 3 In reality, the "enticement" in Megan's Law
may leave the states with as little choice as the federal coercion
in Printz. This would occur if the states were so reliant on the
federal funds that they felt compelled to adhere to whatever
terms the federal government included in its conditions. The
next section will address whether Congress can use federal law
enforcement funds not to compel, but to entice, the states to
enforce a program consistent with the federal guidelines.
2. The Congressional Spending Power
The use of federal funds to influence the manner in which
the states' law enforcement agencies are run questions the
boundaries of constitutional federalism. While Congress cannot
directly commandeer state law enforcement agencies, the fed-
eral government can use monetary incentives to "urge a state to
adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests."55
Congress is able to hold out these incentives as part of its power
to tax and spend under the Spending Clause. 56 Congress is not
restricted in its power to give federal money to the individual
states. Additionally, Congress can tie conditions on the way that
money is spent to further its legislative purpose. 57 For instance,
if Congress gives the states federal money for the construction
of highways, it can require that the construction meets certain
quality standards."5 These conditions are permissible incident
to the spending power to ensure that the money is spent in a
manner consistent with the federal objective for the expendi-
ture.
What is not clear is whether Congress can tie conditions to
the receipt of federal funds which are not directly related to the
use of those funds. If this is within Congress's power, it could
be used as a tool to regulate in areas that would otherwise lie
153 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
154 Pintz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365.
... New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
- U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See supra note 130 for the text of the Spending
Clause.
'-' See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
8 Id. at 215 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
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beyond its enumerated powers. This could in turn conflict with
the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.59
Therefore, the issue in judging the constitutionality of Megan's
Law is whether there is a sufficient connection between the
condition that a state collect and release the specified informa-
tion and the receipt of federal law enforcement funds. The Su-
preme Court addressed the scope of the federal spending power
in South Dakota v. Dole. 16
a. South Dakota v. Dole
In 1984, Congress passed 23 U.S.C. § 158, which "induced"
states to raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one.6 Sec-
tion 158 required the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a
percentage of federal highway funds from states "in which the
purchase or public possession.., of any alcoholic beverages by
a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful." 2 At
the time Congress adopted § 158, South Dakota allowed persons
nineteen-years-old or older to purchase and possess beer con-
taining up to 3.2% alcohol.' South Dakota brought suit against
then-Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, claiming that
§ 158 violated constitutionally protected states rights6 6 South
Dakota argued that the withholding of highway funds violated
rights reserved to the states by the language of the Twenty-first
Amendmente'6 and the constitutional limits on Congress's exer-
cise of its spending power.16
The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether
Congress had the power to directly impose a national minimum
"9 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See supra note 132 for the text of the Tenth Amend-
ment.
'60 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
"' 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1986).
162 mei
'6 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-6-27 (Michie 1986).
'6 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 ("[T]he transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of in-
toxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof is hereby prohibited.") (emphasis
added).
'6 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
744 [Vol. 88
FEDERALISM & MEGAN'S LAW
drinking age in light of the Twenty-first Amendment. 167 Instead,
the Court based its decision on its finding that Congress's use of
a financial incentive to indirectly obtain a uniform drinking age
was a valid use of its spending power, even if Congress did not
have the power to regulate the drinking age directly.16 Thus, as
McCoy and Friedman explain, "although Congress lacks regula-
tory authority to achieve a legislative end on its own, the Con-
gress may 'purchase' state compliance through the use of
conditions attached to spending grants."'6
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
claimed that incident to the spending power, "Congress may at-
tach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeat-
edly employed the power 'to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.'
1 70
Furthermore, Congress's powers under the Spending Clause are
broader than its enumerated powers to regulate directly.71 Spe-
cifically, "a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congres-
sional regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit
the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.""7
Thus, according to the majority, Congress may legitimately in-
fluence state regulation indirectly through conditional appro-
priations in areas where the federal government is not
empowered to regulate directly.'73
However, the Chief Justice also stated that this power is not
unlimited.'7 4 The Court listed four limitations upon Congress's
spending power: (1) the spending power must only be exercised
in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) the conditions upon the
states' receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous; (3) the
conditions must be reasonably related to the purpose of the ex-
6 Id. at 206.
"'Id.
"'Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse 1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 85, 100-01.
170 Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
'7' Id. at 209.
7 Id. at 210.
173 Id.
' Id. at 207.
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penditure; and (4) the condition must not violate an independ-
ent constitutional prohibition.' 75 The Court split over the
proper scope of the limitation that conditions be reasonably re-
lated to the purpose of the program or grant.
176
This limitation actually includes two embedded require-
ments to the conditional use of federal funds. First, the condi-
tion must be related, or have a nexus, to the purpose of the
appropriation." The Court addressed this issue indirectly, say-
ing that " [o]ur cases have not required that we define the outer
bounds of the 'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on the
imposition of conditions under the spending power."178 This
implies that there is an outer bound or nexus requirement. If
the condition does not have a reasonable relationship to the
purpose of the grant, the condition may be beyond the scope of
Congress's spending power.
The Court found that the condition upon the receipt of
highway funds was "directly related to one of the main purposes
for which highway funds are expended-safe interstate travel."'7
Thus, without defining the outer bound of the germaneness re-
quirement, the Court concluded that the drinking age was suffi-
ciently related to interstate travel to be within the congressional
spending power.180
Even if one accepts the Court's "germaneness" analysis in
Dole, there is a second limitation on Congress's ability to set
conditions on the receipt of federal grants. Namely, the pur-
pose of the appropriation must be something in which there is a
federal interest in imposing a national project or program.18' In
Dole, the Court found that a legitimate federal interest did exist
in encouraging a uniform minimum drinking age because the
varying drinking ages gave teens an incentive to drive long dis-
tances to neighboring states to drink.18 2 The Court found that
175 Id. at 207-08.
'
76 Id. at 207.
Id.
'~' Id. at 208 n.3.
' Id. at 208.
180 Id.
' Id. at 207.
182 Id. at 209.
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these teens often drove home after a night of drinking, which
had an adverse impact on highway safety.!ss Thus, the Court
concluded that Congress had a legitimate interest in encourag-
ing a uniform minimum drinking age.184
The majority concluded that the conditional grant author-
ized by § 158 was nothing more than a "mild encouragement to
the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they
would otherwise choose."lss Thus, the Court held that even if
Congress could not impose a national drinking age directly (an
issue which was not decided), the inducement of a uniform
drinking age was a legitimate use of Congress's spendingpower.186
b. Criticism of the Dole Decision
Justices O'Connor and Brennan dissented from the majority
opinion in Dole.'87 Justice O'Connor authored the more de-
tailed criticism of the majority's decision. In her dissent, she ar-
gued that there is not a reasonable relationship between the
condition that the states impose a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one and the expenditure of federal funds for highway
construction."' Instead, the condition was an attempt to regu-
late the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages.'" Justice
O'Connor argued that this attempt to regulate was beyond the
federal government's power because it was reserved to the states
under the Twenty-first Amendment.' 9°
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that Congress
could tie conditions on the receipt and use of federal funds "to
further 'the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs.""91 Justice O'Connor also concurred in finding that
15Id.
"AId.
"s Id. at 211.
'Id. at 212.
Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting); i&. (Brennan,J., dissenting).
"' Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
'"Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
"'Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).




the federal government's power to tax and spend is broader
than its delegated regulatory powers. 92 The spending power is
broader in scope because it is "limited only by the qualification
that the expenditure be for the 'general welfare. ' "93 This means
that Congress can freely contribute money when the purpose of
the contribution is thought to be in the general welfare-assum-
ing that the expenditure is free from conditions imposed upon
the states.
However, Justice O'Connor in dissent disagreed with the
majority's application of the requirement that the policy objec-
tives of conditions tied to the state's receipt of federal funds be
reasonably related to the purpose of the federal expenditure.'9
While Congress is able to give money freely to states in the pur-
suit of the general welfare, it cannot tie a condition to the re-
ceipt of these funds unrelated to the purpose of the
contribution. 5  The fact that Congress's spending power is
broader than its enumerated regulatory powers does not mean
that "because Congress may spend for the general welfare, it
may use the spending power to circumvent all limitations on its
regulatory powers.
Justice O'Connor found that the relationship between a
uniform minimum drinking age and interstate highway con-
struction was insufficient "to justify so conditioning funds ap-
propriated for that purpose."' 97 As she explained:
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to
insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist as a
condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or change
regulations in other areas of the State's social and economic life because
of an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety. In-
deed, if the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effectively regulate
almost any area of a State's social, political, or economic life on the the-
'"Id. at 212-13 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
,'McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 103.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a criticism ofJustice O'Connor's Spending
Clause analysis, see David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 57 (1994)
(arguing that her dissent is overly restrictive).
'96 McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 103.
,97 Dole, 483 U.S. at 213-14 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
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ory that use of the interstate transportation system is somehow en-
hanced.'"
Therefore, when the constitutionality of a condition is at issue,
the correct inquiry should be whether the condition specifies
how the money is to be spent or attempts to regulate an unre-
lated (or tenuously related) area of law.'9 Injustice O'Connor's
opinion, "Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to
impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how
the money should be spent." 2 The enumeration of powers
given to Congress implies that there is something not enumer-
ated. If Congress can use its extensive financial resources to in-
fluence any area of state law, it has a defacto ability "to tear down
the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a
parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save
such as are self-imposed."2s '
The Dole decision has also come under attack from academ-
ics. 20 2 Scholars have argued that the states often do not have a
realistic choice other than to accept the federal government's
condition upon the receipt of funds. s This lack of real choice
occurs because the federal government has become richer in re-
lation to the states; the federal tax burden has steadily increased
over the last several decades. 2°4 This heightened federal burden
makes it more difficult for the states to raise local taxes because
their constituents have less after-federal-tax income then in the
"3 Id. at 215 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
"9 Id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
Id. at 216 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the National Conference
of State Legislatures et al. at 19-20, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (No.
86-260)).
2o' Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 78 (1936)).
" See, e.g., McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169; H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated
Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REv. 651, 657 (1995);James V. Corbelli, Note,
Tower of Power: South Dakota v. Dole and the Strength of Spending, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV.
1097 (1988); Donald J. Mizerk, Note, The Coercion Test and Conditional Grants to the
States, 40 VAND. L REv. 1159, 1193-95 (1987). See generally HaroldJ. Krent, Fragment-
ing the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Governmen4 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 72-77 (1990) (arguing that there are numer-
ous federal attempts to coerce states with incentives which are unconstitutional).




past.05 Therefore, the increased federal income tax in relation
to the states has resulted in the states being put in a position of
greater dependence on federal funds.2 This increasing reli-
ance on federal moneys "invites Congress to extract concessions
from the states, to require that the states accept certain 'condi-
tions .... ,,0 Because the Court in Dole failed to limit Con-
gress's ability to impose conditions on states that are beyond the
scope of its enumerated powers, Congress can now require that
"the state impose on itself or its citizens some regulation that
Congress constitutionally could not have imposed itself."208 This
is an evisceration of the efficacy of the Tenth Amendment. Be-
cause Dole allows Congress to regulate whenever it can creatively
adduce some tenuous relationship between the "regulation"
and a grant of federal funds, the federal government is no
longer effectively limited to its enumerated powers.
Moreover, the Dole Court failed to recognize the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions." This doctrine has been repeat-
edly addressed by the Court in First Amendment cases.2l In
these cases, the Court recognized that a congressional threat to
withhold a benefit based on a person's willingness to surrender
an individual right is no different than imposing a fine when the
individual engages in a protected activity.210 A person who
chooses to violate a regulation and pay a fine is in the same po-
sition as a person who decides not to adhere to a condition
knowing that she will have to forego the attached benefit.
21
'
Therefore, under the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions,"
205 Id.
2" Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985).
0'7 McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 86.
Id. at 87.
See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding a condi-
tional grant of federal funds to media entities which complied with statute an uncon-
stitutional restriction on freedom of the press); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding conditions on unemployment
compensation were a violation of First Amendment religious freedoms); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding the condition on receipt of unemployment
compensation that worker be able to work Saturdays was an unconstitutional violation
of Saturday Sabbatarians' freedom of religion).
210 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 404.
21 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
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Congress could not tie the receipt of welfare to the recipient's
agreeing not to criticize the President, just as Congress could
not fine a welfare recipient for her criticism.
Likewise, in dealing with the states, "where Congress ...
cannot impose a fine to regulate.certain conduct [because the
right of regulation is reserved to the states], it cannot withhold a
... benefit for engaging in that same conduct."2 18 The condi-
tions placed on federal appropriations to states are "unconstitu-
tional conditions" when the withholding of funds for failure to
comply would have the same effect as fining a state if it does not
agree to relinquish one of its constitutionally reserved rights. In
this situation, there is no realistic difference between a federal
grant, which is dependent on state compliance, and a federal
fine on the state. Both present "the same governmental inter-
ference with the individual's [or state's] constitutionally pro-
tected liberty to engage in the conduct."
2 1 4
In Dole, Chief Justice Rehnquist tried to circumvent this ar-
gument by attempting to distinguish between conditional grants
which are incentives and grants which are "so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' 2 5 How-
ever, this argument ignores the states' increased reliance on all
funds received from the federal government discussed above.
216
Also, if the condition on the grant is an unconstitutional exer-
cise of congressional regulation, the degree of the conditional
expenditure's unconstitutionality should be irrelevant.
Prior to Dole, the Court addressed the Spending Clause in
the context of federalism and consistently found that any differ-
ence between a conditional grant and a fine was illusory. 7
United States v. Butler involved a dispute over whether Congress
could tax agricultural processors and use the funds as an incen-
" McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 87.
213 Id.
"' Id. at 103.
"5 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
216 See supra notes 203-08.
"' See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at
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tive to producers to leave their land fallow. 2 8 The federal gov-
ernment claimed that even if this regulation was beyond its
delegated regulatory powers, it was a valid exercise of Congress's
power to tax and spend for the general welfare.219 The Court
disagreed, finding that the scheme went beyond Congress's
power to spend.220 The Court found that instead of simply
spending funds, Congress was attempting to coerce state sub-
mission to a federal program that Congress did not have the
authority to impose.! The Court went on to hold that while
Congress can impose restrictions on the way federal money is
spent, it cannot use conditional grants to regulate.2 Thus, But-
ler stood for the proposition that Congress cannot use a condi-
tion on a federal appropriation to achieve a regulatory goal
outside its delegated powers.n
In the Dole decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the
proposition in Butler that no conceptual difference exists be-
tween conditional grants and direct regulation.224 The majority
relied heavily on Steward Machine Co. v. Davis2 in support of its
proposition that a condition is different than a regulation as
long as adherence to the condition is voluntary.22 6 In Steward, a
taxpayer challenged a federal unemployment compensation
statutory scheme under which taxpayers could credit payments
made into the state's unemployment compensation program
against their federal tax liability.227 The plaintiff paid the federal
tax under protest and then sued for a refund, claiming the
compensation program was an unconstitutional regulation of
2 18 Butler, 297 U.S. at 58-59.
219 Id. at 62.
220Id. at 72.
221 Id.
2n Id. at 73.
Id. at 78. For an analysis of the limits of the precedential reliance of Butler unre-
lated to its ruling on the scope of the Spending Clause, see McCoy & Friedman, supra
note 169, at 107-08.
224 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987). See supra notes 161-86 (dis-
cussing Dole).
n2 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
26 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
2" Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 574.
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the states' unemployment programs.m The Steward Court up-
held the scheme in ruling against the taxpayer finding, inter alia,
that the tax scheme did not result in a coercion of the states by
the federal government.2  ChiefJustice Rehnquist quoted from
Steward in Dole in concluding that a conditional federal expendi-
ture did not violate states' rights as long as the incentive was
only a temptation and not federal coercion.m
Professors McCoy and Friedman assert that the Chief Jus-
tice's reliance on Steward was misguided.21 Unlike Butler and
Dole, the issue in Steward was not whether Congress could use its
spending power to achieve a regulatory goal that would other-
wise be beyond the ambit of its delegated powers. 2 Instead,
Steward involved a challenge of Congress's taxing power. =s The
taxpayer protested the payment of a federal income tax to pay
for an unemployment compensation program, not a conditional
tax exemption.2 Thus, the plaintiff's clearly erroneous conten-
tion was that Congress could not tax to spend money on an un-
employment compensation program.2
Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist misapplied dicta from
Steward that addresses the difference between temptation and
coercion to the factual situation faced in Dole. Additionally, and
more importantly, as Professors McCoy and Friedman point out,
the Court in Steward explicitly rejected the anticipated interpre-
tation of its holding that the Dole Court reached when it stated
that:
We do not say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of Congress, if it is
laid upon the condition that a state may escape its operation through the
2Id. at 578.
2 Id. at 585-91, 598.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 ("'[E]very rebate from a tax when conditioned upon con-
duct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is
equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties."') (quoting Steward
Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 589-90).
2' McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 108-09.
2 Id. at 109-10.





adoption of a statute unrelated in subject matter to activities fairly within
the scope of national policy and power. No such question is before us."O
Thus, the Steward decision does not stand for the proposition
for which the Dole majority opinion cites it.237
Hence, where Congress cannot regulate directly, it should
also be unable to use its purse strings to do so indirectly. The
Dole Court "was willing to assume that Congress could not im-
pose a minimum drinking age through the exercise of its regu-
latory powers, but permitted Congress to withhold benefits
(highway funds) to obtain the same end."2s  The Dole Court
failed to correctly apply the settled Spending Clause precedent.
Prior cases such as Butler and Steward hold that Congress cannot
use a conditional grant to encourage a state to impose a regula-
tion on itself which Congress would otherwise be powerless to
invoke, regardless of whether the encouragement is seen as a
temptation or coercion.2 There is no practical difference be-
tween the conditional withholding of benefits and the imposi-
tion of a fine to regulate an area of law which is beyond the
scope of Congress's regulatory power. Dole diminishes the effi-
cacy of the ideal that the national government is limited to its
enumerated powers.
c. Fullilove v. Klutznick
This Comment does not suggest that all conditions placed
on the receipt of federal funds go beyond the scope of the
Spending Power. For instance, Fullilove v. Klutznick involved a
challenge to a provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, which made state receipt of federal public works grants
conditional on an agreement by the state government to allo-
cate at least 10% of the federal money to contracts with minority
businesses.2 10  The Court ruled that the condition fell within
Congress's regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause and
2' Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
217 McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 112.
Id. at 104.
23 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936); Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at
590.40Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.24' Additionally, the Court found
that the condition was legitimate under the Spending Clause
because the federal government's spending powers are at least
as broad as its delegated regulatory powers.
In contrast to Dole, even if the provision was beyond Con-
gress's regulatory capabilities, the conditional expenditure was
constitutional. The condition in Fullilove did nothing more
than enumerate the specifications and purposes of the expendi-
ture.4 The provision simply ensured that the federal money
would be spent for its intended purpose. Unlike Dole, Fullilove
did not involve a provision attached to a grant to achieve an un-
related regulatory objective. Thus, even if the condition in Ful-
lilove had not fallen within any of the federal government's
enumerated powers, the provision would not have presented
the Court with the unconstitutional exercise of Spending Power
faced in Dole.
III. THE SPENDING POWER APPLIED TO MEGAN'S LAW
With the passage of Megan's Law in 1996, Congress condi-
tioned the receipt of certain law enforcement funds on states
agreeing to administer programs that would have the purpose
of releasing specified information to the public.244 Therefore,
Megan's Law falls squarely within the scope of the Dole analysis
because, as in Dole, Congress is attempting to coerce state com-
pliance with a regulatory scheme by threatening to withhold
federal funds for noncompliance. Accordingly, the issue in
judging the legality of Megan's Law is whether there is a suffi-
cient connection between the condition that a state release the
specified information and effective law enforcement.24 If the
relationship is too tenuous-as the Court should have found in
Dole-Megan's Law is not a valid exercise of congressional
spending power. Instead, the condition is an unconstitutional
attempt at regulation beyond Congress's delegated regulatory
" Id. at 475-78.
"2 Id. at 475.
See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 169, at 114.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1996). See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
245 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
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powers. On the other hand, if Megan's Law merely specifies the
object of the federal expenditure, then the condition is inciden-
tal to Congress's spending power.
The condition on the receipt of law enforcement funds in-
cluded in Megan's Law falls in between the condition that
should have been found unconstitutional in Dole and the legiti-
mate expenditure specifications in Fullilove. The condition
Congress imposed on the states with the passage of Megan's Law
specifies how some of the federal money is to be spent by local
law enforcement agencies-to release information pertaining to
sex offenders necessary to protect the public.246 If this is all the
amendment does, then the condition is clearly within the con-
gressional spending power.
However, if the release of this type of information is not a
task which is traditionally performed by law enforcement, then
the requirement may be too tenuously related to the purpose of
a law enforcement grant. This is especially true since the
amendment coerces a state agency to perform a certain func-
tion. Because the government requires the state agency to take
action, it is a regulation of the states qua states.247 This is in con-
trast to Dole, which was a regulation of the states' citizens, not
the states themselves.248 When the state itself is being regulated,
the nexus between the condition and the grant must be closer
or the condition will constitute an impermissible federal regula-don.249
For instance, if Congress required local police agencies to
clear paths in federal forests for the state to receive federal law
enforcement funds, the Court would almost certainly find the
condition to be an unconstitutional federal regulation. This is
true even though the statute appears to do nothing more than
specify how the funds are to be used. Otherwise, Congress
could regulate the administration of state agencies with federal
246 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1996).
"7 See supra notes 136, 139, 148-51 and accompanying text, for an analysis of Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286-87 (1981) and New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (addressing difference between federal regu-
lation of individuals and federal regulation of states).
24s Dole 483 U.S. at 203.
249 New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
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enticements wholly unrelated to the purpose of the expendi-
ture.
Hence, the issue here becomes whether the release of in-
formation is sufficiently related to the functions of law enforce-
ment to justify the condition imposed on the federal funds.
The release of information to the public pertaining to sex of-
fenders is not something that law enforcement agencies tradi-
tionally have done. On the contrary, this is a very new concept,
beginning only recently with the passage of the state version of
Megan's Law in Washington and NewJersey. °
State agencies, though, do frequently compile and retain in-
formation pertaining to convicted offenders.21 Additionally, po-
lice often make information available to the public when doing
so would aid in the apprehension of a suspect.252 Common ex-
amples include the use of wanted posters and television shows
such as America's Most Wanted to track suspected criminals. s
However, these actions all relate to police activities that take
place after a crime already has occurred. They relate to the tra-
ditional law enforcement goal of apprehension of the criminal
suspect. In contrast, Megan's Law is ostensibly the first attempt
at releasing information about persons who might commit a
criminal act in the future.
Nevertheless, the fact that Megan's Law coerces the police
to do something that they have not done before does not mean
that the release of this information is unrelated to traditional
police functions. Deterrence is as traditional a function of law
enforcement as apprehension of criminal suspects.24 Addition-
ally, even if this type of deterrence has not been a method tradi-
0 See supra text accompanying note 31.
"" See United States v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
759 n.10 (1989) (Attorney General has duty to compile information regarding con-
victed criminals'for use by state and federal agencies); Feldman, supra note 40, at
1112 (government agencies such as Office of Court Administration retain criminal
record information).
12 See Brief on Behalf of the Public Defender, Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995), reprinted in 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 75, 96 (1996).
" SeeFeldman, supra note 40, at 1096.
' See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Vera Cruz v. Escondido, 126 F.3d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that de-
terrence is one of the primary purposes of criminal law).
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tionally utilized by the police, law enforcement agencies must
have the flexibility necessary to be effective. Police agencies
must be allowed to modernize with advances in technology,
criminology, forensic science, and police techniques to adapt to
changes in societal behavior.
The apparent goal in releasing the disputed information to
the community is the prevention of crime. Crimes can be pre-
vented by deterring potential criminals or by educating poten-
tial victims on how to protect themselves. Thus, the 1996
Amendment to Megan's Law falls within this function of law en-
forcement. There is a reasonable relationship between the re-
lease of information condition in Megan's Law and the statutory
purpose of law enforcement. Therefore, the federal govern-
ment had jurisdiction under the Spending Clause to enact the
1996 version of Megan's Law.
However, even if Congress can pass legislation such as Me-
gan's Law, this does not necessarily mean that it should. In con-
trast to the inquiry regarding whether Congress has jurisdiction
to enact certain legislation, federal interest analysis asks whether
Congress should involve itself in certain matters.f 5 Thus, dem-
onstrating this nexus should not conclude our analysis because
establishing jurisdiction does not necessarily indicate a federal
interest. Without a federal interest, Congress should not prom-
ulgate federal criminal legislation simply because it can. Ac-
cordingly, we must ask what the federal government's interest is
in involving itself in criminal law matters traditionally handled
by the states.
Congress certainly has a general interest in preventing
crime, especially crimes against children. However, the states
also have a strong incentive to prevent repeat sex crimes. Be-
cause the states have an incentive to regulate child sex offend-
ers, there is no reason to believe that the states will fail to
responsibly address the problem in the absence of congressional
action.
2" See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L.
RFv. 1127, 1130 (1997).
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Furthermore, in many ways, the states are best suited to de-
velop the solution that is locally most appropriate. 6 The Su-
preme Court repeatedly has noted that primary responsibility
for defining and enforcing criminal law lies with the states.s
Since most crimes, including sex offenses, directly threaten the
neighborhood in which the crime occurs, local government has
a more immediate and significant interest in regulating conduct
it finds to be criminal than the federal government's general in-
terest in preventing crime.s
In addition, state laws are drafted by legislators who are in
closer contact with the local community than members of Con-
gress. Hence, it is more likely in most situations that state laws
which are not distorted by the influence of the federal bank-roll
will more accurately reflect goals and values of the community.
Federal funding invariably alters the standards states may have
otherwise set for themselves in determining how to address the
problem of repeat sex offenders.
Additionally, federal enticement of states is inefficient be-
cause it pushes the states toward uniformity. Without this influ-
ence, states are more readily able to implement a variety of
regulatory schemes which provides citizens with a choice. If we
think of citizens as "consumers" of government services, then
variety among the states increases the value of government to
citizens by providing them with a choice of which state govern-
ment's bundle of "products" to consume (by choosing that state
as the state in which to reside). Citizens can "shop around" and
choose the state in which the state government's use of limited
resources closely matches the citizen's priorities. 9
"6 See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers'.: In De-
fense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 752, 775-79 (1995).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("[u]nder our fed-
eral system, the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law.'") (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)); United
States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581-83 (KennedyJ., concurring).
" See Calabresi, supra note 256. Professor Calabresi refers to this argument as the
Tiebout Model and states: "[s]ocial welfare can be maximized by allowing citizens to
choose from among a number of jurisdictions, each of which provides a different
bundle of public goods." Id. at 775 (quotingJacques LaBoeuf, The Economics of Feder-
alism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 560
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An additional disadvantage to federal commandeering of
state law-making decisions is that the benefits of decentraliza-
tion are allayed. When states are left to their own accord in de-
ciding how best to handle a legal problem, they serve a valuable
function of acting as legislative laboratories.m The different
states can experiment with various solutions to a national prob-
lem at the local level. If one solution proves especially effective,
it can be copied by other jurisdictions. Federal funding miti-
gates this advantage by forcing uniformity.
Finally, considerations of efficiency favor granting the
power to oversee the bulk of criminal law to the states.26 1 States
have the greatest knowledge of what local resources are avail-
able and how they should best be utilized. For instance, a state
could agree that notification is beneficial, but that the benefit is
outweighed by the cost of administering a notification program.
The state could accordingly conclude that its law enforcement
funds would be better spent in some other manner. 
2
For all the above reasons, the states' interest in deterring fu-
ture repeat sex offenders is stronger than Congress's general in-
terest in preventing crime. Therefore, if Congress is to invoke
its powers under the Spending Clause to influence the manner
in which states administer their criminal justice system, it should
have an interest sufficiently compelling to override the benefits
of leaving Megan's Law-type statutes to the states. Otherwise, it
should not legislate simply because it can.
(1994)). This argument makes the dual assumptions that individuals have perfect in-
formation regarding the differences between the states, and that individuals are able
to freely move to the most desirable state. However, even if these assumptions are not
applicable to all people, efficiency will still be increased if the assumptions apply at
least to some people. While the entire population may not benefit from the choice,
at least some citizens probably will. These citizens will go to the state best suited for
them and overall efficiency will be greater than if no citizens have this choice.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the States may perform
their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the
best solution is far from clear"); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2307 (1996)
(ScaliaJ., dissenting).
"' See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HAsINGS L.J. 979, 994 (1995) (factors such as
knowledge of local police and state interests in local prisons allow state agencies to
enforce criminal law more efficiently).
22 For a more thorough treatment of this argument, see infra Part V.
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For instance, Congress could potentially have a federal in-
terest in promoting uniform administration and enforcement of
the notification provisions. 63 If notification provisions are not
uniform, released sex offenders are more likely to move to ju-
risdictions that are more "offender-friendly.",2 6 When offenders
move, they are more difficult to track and the benefits of regis-
tration are lessened.2
While uniformity seems like a legitimate justification, it
lacks a foundation in reality. It is extremely unlikely that any
state will willingly choose to be known as the national safe haven
for child sex offenders. This is not the kind of situation where
there will be a "race to the bottom."2 Additionally, in the un-
likely event that a state should choose to forego community no-
tification, Congress should not deter it from enacting its own
solution to local problems. As Justice Brandeis said in an oft-
quoted dissent, it is "one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country."267 Thus, fears that
a lack of uniformity will substantially hinder national law en-
forcement efforts are largely vacuous, and are certainly out-
weighed by the state's interests in regulating crime.
An alternative justification for federal involvement in Me-
gan's Law is that some states who want to implement a system of
SeeTom Stony & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CoRNELJ.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 247, 302 (1997) (advocating uniformity as a justification for federal in-
volvement).
' Hampson, supra note 113, at A2.
26' Offender compliance with registration requirements goes down when offenders
move to another state for two reasons. First, offenders may either not know they have
a duty to re-register or may not know how to register in their new state. Second,
prosecution for failure to register becomes more difficult when offenders move
around because prosecutors are often unable to confirm whether the person still re-
sides within the state. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 39, at 791,853.
The race to the bottom theory says that, in certain situations, states will have an
incentive to regulate less than other states, often to minimize governmental costs for
its citizens. See Barry Friedman, ValuingFederalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 408 (1997);
Richard L Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).




registration and notification may lack sufficient resources to do
so. In those cases, federal funding that allows the states to pro-
tect their interests would be appropriate. However, the states'
potential need for federal assistance does not justify the attach-
ment of conditions on the receipt of those funds. If Congress's
goal is simply to assist, it should not dabble in legislation by im-
posing conditions on its willingness to help.
Because the federal government's concern in preventing
sex crimes against juveniles is considerably less substantial than
the states, Congress should not continue to burden the states
with restrictions on the use of available law enforcement funds.
The obvious retort to this argument is that the very purpose of
the Spending Power is to allow Congress to spend funds as it
sees fit.268 This is true where a federal interest is implicated. For
instance, when Congress is giving the states federal funds to
build federal interstate highways, it should be allowed to set
guidelines regarding construction standards.2 0 In contrast,
where the federal government's interest is indirect, it should
not throw its financial muscle into the realm of criminal laws
historically defined and administered by the states simply be-
cause the Dole precedent says that it can. To do so distorts the
states' right in our federalist system to determine what is "crimi-




On a final note, as a practical matter, it is worth considering
whether the states have any real reason not to comply with Me-
gan's Law, even if it infringes upon their reserved rights. If not,
' See supra notes 154-57, 170-73.
269 See supra note 158.
0 For an argument that federal involvement in this area of law is justifiable, see
Stony & Dayton, supra note 263, at 300-02. Professors Stony and Dayton argue that
the negative impact federal involvement has on state diversity and experimentation is
overblown because of the apparent nationwide support for anti-sex offender laws. Id.
at 301. This argument misses the point. While everyone likely agrees that these
crimes present a problem that must be addressed, states potentially disagree on the
best way to address it. The federal law coerces states to all go down the same path,
thereby lessening the benefits that normally inhere in leaving such decisions to the
states.
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a constitutional dispute may never arise, and this Comment may
be nothing more than a purely academic inquiry. After all, by
the time Congress passed the 1996 Amendment, nearly all of
the states had already enacted some version of Megan's Law into
their state ordinances2' If the federal law is simply redundant,
then the 1996 Amendment could be viewed as nothing more
than the condition-free appropriation of federal funds.
However, it is not a foregone conclusion that every state is
in agreement regarding community notification. Seven states
which presently require sex offenders to register with law en-
forcement agencies do not allow for the release of this informa-
tion to the public.2 The reasons these states may have elected
not to release this information are understandable. First, as
hard as it is to be sympathetic to sex offenders, their rights can-
not be wantonly violated because of the distasteful nature of
their crimes. A state legislature might therefore decide that
once persons have served their time for the commission of a
crime, their debt to society must end. While the mandatory reg-
istration may be purely regulatory, a state government could de-
cide that the release of the information is excessively punitive.
Second, the release of information can be expensive to ad-
minister. States must be allowed to prioritize their objectives
and plan a state budget accordingly. Since a crime has its great-
est impact on the state in which it is committed, a state should
be able to conclude that the release of information pertaining
to sex offenders is not worth the opportunity cost of foregoing
other law enforcement efforts without forfeiting a part of its
share of federal funds. For instance, a state should be able to
decide that, while community notification is important, it has a
more pressing need for new patrol cars or new officers to fight
narcotics distribution. Narcotics may simply be a greater prob-
lem locally than repeat sex offenses. A state that did not want to
use a portion of its federal money to set up a notification
2 See 142 CoNG. REC. H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statements of Rep. McGol-
lum). For a list of current state statutes, see supra note 32.
' See supra note 37.




scheme could argue that a federal expenditure on a uniform
sex offender program is not an exercise of the spending power
"in pursuit of 'the general welfare.'
27
While this claim is colorable, its chances of success in court
are slim. First, courts "defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress" in determining whether an expenditure is for the
general welfare.2 Second, the statutory language of Megan's
Law is ambiguous and leaves the states with substantial discre-
tion in determining how to administer their local notification
program. The amended Megan's Law statute says that state po-
lice agencies shall release information "necessary to protect the
public."26 Thus, the statute arguably gives the states broad dis-
cretion in determining what information they must release to
protect the public, if any. On the other hand, since the phrase-
ology is ambiguous, a state and the federal government could
disagree on whether the state is complying with the mandate
that it release a sufficient amount of information. If the federal
government decides to withhold federal funds for lack of com-
pliance, the state would almost certainly bring a constitutional
challenge to the 1996 Amendment. Thus, the inquiry into
whether the federal version of Megan's Law is constitutional is
notjust an academic exercise.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Court erred in finding a sufficient connection
between a minimum drinking age and highway money in South
Dakota v. Dole, the requisite nexus is present in the 1996
Amendment to Megan's Law. Police agencies frequently com-
pile and retain information pertaining to convicted offenders.
Additionally, police often make information available to the
public when doing so would aid in the apprehension of a sus-
pect. Perhaps most common is the use of wanted posters to
track suspected criminals. The 1996 Amendment does little
more than specify how the federal government wants states to
use a small portion of federal law enforcement funds in the pur-
"" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
vs Id.
26 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1996).
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suit of law enforcement. Since conditions which specify the in-
tended use of the federal money are incident to Congress's
spending power,27 the 1996 Amendment falls within the federal
government's rights under the Spending Clause.
Nevertheless, Congress has invaded the province of the
states without considering whether it should have done so. Al-
though the federal government understandably shares an inter-
est with the states in combating the problem of sex offenses
against children, it should leave the resolution of this problem
to the states. The federal government's concern is neither as
immediate or direct as the interest of local communities in pro-
tecting their children. If Congress wants to help in the fight
against sex crimes against juveniles, it should contribute funds
without conditions that distort the states' ability to decide for
themselves how to create the best solution. By attaching condi-
tions that are not related to a direct federal interest, Congress
has warped the balance found in our federal system and less-
ened the benefits that inhere in having states determine how to
administer their criminal justice systems.
2" Dole 483 U.S. at 206.
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